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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Sarah Joann Fencl appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment.
Following her guilty pleas to driving under the influence and being a persistent violator,
she was sentenced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her both
because it failed to realize that the minimum five year sentence for a persistent violator
enhancement does not require the five years be a fixed term and because it sentenced
her to an excessive sentence when it imposed sentence without giving proper weight or
consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in this case. Furthermore, Ms. Fencl
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Idaho Criminal Rule
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion because the district court clearly continued to
misunderstand what minimum sentence is required when a defendant is subject to a
persistent violator enhancement.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the district
court was aware that a sentence enhanced by a persistent violator enhancement does
not need to contain a minimum five year fixed sentence as evidenced by the district
court's knowledge of State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Fencl's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES 1
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion, both at sentencing and in denying the
Ru!e 35 motion, when it failed to recognize that the persistent violator statute did
not require the imposition of a minimum sentence of five years fixed, but a
minimum unified sentence of five years?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Ms. Fencl, a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, following her pleas of guilty
to driving under the influence and a persistent violator enhancement?

1

Ms. Fencl does not believe that any reply is necessary on the second issue because
the State's argument on this issue is unremarkable.
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ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The Rule
35 ~11otion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator Statute Did Not
Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years Fixed, But A Minimum
Unified Sentence Of Five Years
A.

Introduction
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court believed that it had to sentence her to a

minimum fixed sentence of five years because of her plea of guilty to a persistent
violator enhancement. Idaho Code §·19-2514, the persistent violator statute, provides
that a sentence enhanced by the persistent violator enhancement must receive a
minimum five year sentence, not a minimum five year fixed sentence.

The district

court's belief that it must impose a minimum of five years fixed was misplaced and,
ultimately, led to an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The
Rule 35 Motion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator
Statute Did Not Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years
Fixed, But A Minimum Unified Sentence Of Five Years
On appeal, the State notes that the district court referenced State v. Toyne, 151

Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011 ), specifically at the change of plea hearing. (Respondent's
Brief, p.6 (citing Tr., p7, Ls.9-19.) The State has asserted that, "In light of the district
court's expressed knowledge of this case, Fencl cannot show that the district court
actually misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion."

(Respondent's Brief,

p.7.) Ms. Fencl asserts that this reliance is misplaced based on statements made by
the district court following the change of plea hearing which suggest that despite the
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court's knowledge of Toyne it did not understand that only a five year unified sentence
was required.
Certainly, the State is correct that Toyne holds that, "The statute requires only a
unified sentence of at least five years and such sentence may, in the court's discretion,

be suspended." Id. at 783. The district court clearly articulated that it was aware of
Toyne.

(Tr., p., Ls.9-19.) However, at the change of plea hearing, the district court

limited its discussion of Toyne and stated only that it understood it could suspend the
sentence. (Tr., p. 7, Ls.14-19.) Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, the district court
acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to suspend the sentence, but again did not
specifically discuss whether or not the court was aware that the persistent violator
enhancement required imposition of only a unified sentence of a minimum of five years.
(Tr., p.32, L.4 - p.33, L.10.)
In fact, despite the district court's statement that it was aware of Toyne, it made
statements that imply that it did not recognize the full holding of the Toyne opinion. The
district court's statements show that it understood it could suspend the sentence, but
raised concerns that the court was unaware the required five year sentence was not a
requirement for a minimum five year fixed sentence.

During sentencing, the district

court noted that "[g]iven the persistent violator enhancement, it limits the sentences that
I can impose since I am imposing a prison sentence in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.)
The district court then imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
(Tr., p.33, Ls.6-10.) The statement from the district court suggests that it may have
believed it had to impose a fixed term of five years.
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Later, in denying Ms. Fencl's Rule 35 motion, in which she specifically noted
concerns that the district court had believed it's sentencing discretion was more limited
than it actually was and requested a reduction of her five year fixed term, the district
court stated that, "[t]he Defendant's motion for reconsideration acknowledges a fixed
term of five years was required but asks the court, in its discretionary [sic], for leniency
in a reduction of the indeterminate portion of the sentence." (R., pp.106-108.)
This shows that the district court incorrectly believed, not only that Ms. Fencl had
conceded that a five year fixed sentence is required, but that the persistent violator
statue requires a minimum fixed five year sentence. These statements raise serious
concerns that, while the district court was aware of Toyne and clearly understood it
could suspend Ms. Fencl's sentence, it did not understand that it could also impose a
lesser fixed period as long as the sentence was a minimum, unified, five year term. As
such, despite the district court's mentioning of the Toyne opinion, the district court later
statements show that it clearly did not recognize that it had the discretion to impose a
lesser fixed sentence.
The State has also asserted that, "However, in the alternative, even if the district
court misperceived its sentencing discretion, it is clear from the record that any such
misunderstanding did not actually impact the court's sentencing determination or denial
of Fencl's I.C.R. 35 motion. Any such error is therefore harmless." (Respondent's Brief,
p.7.) Ms. Fencl asserts that this is incorrect.

Again, at the sentencing hearing, the

district court noted that "[g]iven the persistent violator enhancement, it limits the
sentences that I can impose since I am imposing a prison sentence in this case."
(Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) The fact that the district court then imposed, what it presumably
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believed was the minimum required fixed term, five years, shows that the district court
was considering the least severe fixed sentence possible. Therefore, we cannot know
what the fixed term of imprisonment may have been if the district court had correctly
recognized that it had discretion to impose a lesser fixed sentence. The district court
was unable to effectively apply its sentencing discretion and, as such, the State has
failed to meet its burden to prove the error is harmless.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Fencl respectfully requests that this Court remand her case for a new
sentencing hearing in which the district court must consider the proper application of the
persistent violator enhancement. Alternatively, she requests that the order denying her
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.

Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it

deems appropriate.
DATED this 1J1h day of November, 2014.
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